In 1986, NBER published a paper `Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?’ by Daniel Raff and Lawrence Summers. This paper related to Ford’s introduction of the five dollar day in January 1914, which doubled the pay of his factory workers. The paper is available here:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2101.pdf
Ford himself noted that `There was. . .no charity in any way involved.. .We wanted to pay these wages so that the business would be on a lasting foundation. We were building for the future. A low wage business is always insecure.. .The payment of five dollars a day for an eight hour day was one of the finest cost cutting moves we ever made’.
The NBER paper analysed the key motivations and background for this:
By 1910 roughly two-thirds of the workforce were either foremen or mechanics rated either "highly skilled" or "skilled". Further, by 1914, three quarters of it was foreign-born and more than half were recent immigrants from the unindustrialized regions of southern and eastern Europe.
However the assembly line and division of labor had been carried on to such a point that an overwhelming majority of the jobs consisted of a very few simple operations. In most cases a complete mastery of the movements did not take more than from five to ten minutes. As tasks came to be divided more and more finely and to become more and more routinized, work became more menial. At the same time, the need for workers to be in lockstep to make the assembly line work smoothly increased the pressure on workers. As one worker said `If I keep putting on Nut No.86 for about 86 more days, I will be Nut No.86 in the Pontiac bughouse’.
As a result, worker dissatisfaction at Ford took visible form. In 1913, annual turnover at the Ford plant reached 370 percent. Ford had to hire 50,448 men during the course of the year in order to maintain the average labor force at 13,623. The 370 percent was high even by the standards of the fluid Detroit labor market, in which turnover rates of 200 percent were quite common. High turnover was a result of a combination of factors including the monotony of jobs, arbitariness of some foremen, inequities in pay, and inadequacies in plant conditions. Absenteeism was also high at 10% daily. This meant that on the average day it was necessary to make use of 1300 or 1400 replacement workers each of whom was inexperienced at the specific task they were to perform.
Based on this, the authors conclude that Ford may have increased wages in an effort to raise productivity by reducing the turnover and absenteeism, or through getting directly at some morale problem. Alternatively, he may have doubled wages for some personal reason--to be magnanimous or perhaps to become famous. There is evidence in the events leading up to the five-dollar day to support and to refute both interpretations.
The increase resulted in the quit rate fell 87 percent between March of 1913 and March of l9l4. Further, profits rose steadily in both nominal and real terms in 1914 and 1915, inspite of out of pocket cost of $10 million for the five-dollar day programme. Productivity improved as between 1913 and 1914 the Ford company produced 15 percent more cars per day, with 2000 (or about 14 percent fewer) workers and a reduction in the number of hours worked per worker. Estimates indicate that Ford plan raised wages by 105 percent, but labour costs by only 35 perent, implying about a 50 percent improvement in productivity.