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Originally Posted by Samurai What is the future of Air Force if air superiority is hard to achieve anymore? |
I feel the Ukraine conflict is vastly different from any of the previous air wars where air superiority was achieved by relentless targeting on enemy airfields, Ground based Air Defence Systems, Command Centers, Industries etc. The Russians let go of the pressure on Ukrainian Air Defence too quickly or found it to be unsustainable. More than year into the conflict, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to operate as a credible threat to the Russians( just like the NVA did to the Americans in the Vietnam War or the Mujahideen did to the Soviets in the Aghan War).
While part of the reason why Ukraine has been able to hold out for so long is because of western support by means of weapons, logistics, real time intelligence and early warning. That is not to take away the bravery and resilience of Ukraine's military and its people, but fighting for so long would not have been possible had the support and supply lines not been there from the west (something that is one of the prime targets in any war). It is a different matter though that the Russians cannot go bomb Ukranie's NATO neighbours.
Let's not forget during the initial days of the war, the Russian Air Force was fully involved in the first few days of the war an followed textbook tactics of taking out Ukrainian Air Defences. When the invasion commenced in February 2022, the Russian Air Force fleet of Su-24, Su-34, Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters mounted more than 100 sorties per day, conducting Fighter sweeps, Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences, Air strikes and counter-air missions.
Air strikes were carried out against hundreds of Ukrainian targets such as long-range Radar Stations, Air Defence (AD) systems, and fuel & weapon storage sites mainly along the routes to be followed by the Russian assault forces. These air strikes were supported by electronic jamming and decoys to draw out Ukranian ground defences, which where then attacked by Russian ant-radiation missiles. Ground Based Air Defence systems such as S-300, were rendered ineffective by radar jamming. Ukrainian fighters, mainly the MiG-29s opposed Russian aircraft and inflicted some losses of Russian aircraft. But Ukrainians lost many aircraft to the Russian fighters which were technologically more advanced and proved more than a match for the Ukrainian fighters with their longer-range missiles. The initial reports of the UkrAF taking a heavy toll of Russian fighters, turned out to be highly exaggerated. Russian fighters flew Combat Air Patrols over Kiev and other targets. There were even plans t oair drop paratroopers using Il-76s over Kiev. After the initial success of Russian air operations, there was a pause after the third day which continued for some time. After a week of ground operations,it became clear that the Russian land forces moving towards Kiev got bogged down due to unexpected Ukrainian resistance and logistics issues.
The botched operation to capture and occupy Antonov Hostomel airport clearly exposed the shortcomings in the Russian plan wherein the promised additional Russian forces for occupation of the airport & surrounding areas never came and the Russians had to leave the area in a hurry in face of determined Ukrainian resistance. The primary mission was to establish an airbridge between Kiev & Russia to intensify ground operations. Clearly the Russian supply lines for any such operations were not secure. The focus of the Russian Air Force thereafter shifted to supporting ground troops and securing supply lines, instead of continuing to mount sorties to bury Ukrainian Air Defence for good.
It gave a chance for Ukrainian Air Defences to re-organise and re group. With no offensive air action and no interference by Russian Electronic Warfare aircraft, the Ukrainian ground-based Air Defence systems again started posing a threat to Russian aircraft. This forced intruding Russian aircraft to operate at low levels, which they do to this day...more than a year since the "special operation" began.
The Russian Air Force thus lost control of the Ukrainian airspace which had far reaching consequences. Close Air Support fighters such as the Su-25 faced effective ground based air defence of radar guided AD missiles alongside numerous types of MANPADS. This resulted in the loss of several ground attack fighters and attack helicopters. In short, the Russian Air Force was unable to establish control over the contested airspace, generally considered the primary task of an air force and was thus unable to operate with impunity and attack enemy ground forces. Instead now, it primarily relies on drones and cruise missiles launched from Russian Tu-95s and 22s for strikes deep into Ukraine.
IF we look back at the previous air conflicts, for eg lets say Operation Desert Storm, the Allied Air Forces & warships focused primarily on completely destroying or disabling Iraqi Air Defences(both ground based as well as Iraqi aircraft) and continued doing it till the entire Iraqi Air Defence system collapsed which made it easy for Allied ground attack fighters to easily take out Iraqi Army.
While one can argue that the Ground based Air Defences now are far more effective and difficult to neutralize, the initial Russian successes in the opening days of the war clearly show that had focused operations on neutralizing Ukrainian Air Defence continued, Ukraine may have had a difficult time to regroup and may have lost the war quickly in early 2022 itself.
Air Forces will continue to be the sword arm of militaries around the world and will continue to play a pivotal role in any future conflict. I am sure tactics have evolved and plans/mission profiles are in place to neutralize modern day long range AD systems like S-400 etc.
Finally, it is also the training and the men operating these systems that matter. Case in point, MiG-21s were considered to be junk in combat as the Arab-Israeli Wars showed, but the same MiG-21s in IAF hands proved more than a match against equivalent PAF F-104s & Mirage IIIs in the 1971 war.